*AS Philosophy – Epistemology*

Personal Learning Checklist

**Student Name:**

**CLASS:**

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| **Subject Name:**  **AQA Philosophy** | **Unit Name:**  **Epistemology** |
| *Minimum Target Grade:* | *Aspirational Target Grade:* |

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| **Knowledge/Specification** | **Not Yet** | **Not Sure** | **Yes** | **To address this before the exam I will:-** |
| **THEME 1 – PERCEPTION: WHAT ARE THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION?** | | | | |
| **Key Concepts:**  Direct realism  Indirect realism  Berkeley’s Idealism |  |  |  |  |
| **1.1 Direct realism: the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties.** |  |  |  |  |
| Issues with direct realism, including:   * The argument from illusion * The argument from perceptual variation (Russell's table example) * The argument from hallucination (the possibility of experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception) * The time-lag argument. |  |  |  |  |
| **Knowledge/Specification** | **Not Yet** | **Not Sure** | **Yes** | **To address this before the exam I will:-** |
| **1.2 Indirect realism: the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects that are caused by and represent mind independent objects.** |  |  |  |  |
| Issues with indirect realism, including:   * It leads to scepticism about the 'existence' of the external world (attacking 'realism') * Responses to that issue:   + External world is the 'best hypothesis' (Russell);   + Coherence of the various senses and lack of choice over our experiences (Locke) * It leads to scepticism about the 'nature' of the external world (attacking 'representative') * Responses to that issue:   + Sense data tell us of 'relations' between objects (Russell;   + The distinction between primary and secondary qualities (Locke) * Problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects represent mind-independent objects and are caused by mind-independent objects. | - |  |  |  |
| **Knowledge/Specification** | **Not Yet** | **Not Sure** | **Yes** | **To address this before the exam I will:-** |
| **1.3 3. Berkeley’s idealism: the immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind-dependent objects.** |  |  |  |  |
| Berkeley’s attack on the primary/secondary property distinction and his ‘master’ argument.  Issues with Berkeley’s idealism, including:   * It leads to solipsism * It does not give an adequate account of illusions and hallucinations * It cannot secure objective space and time * Whether God can be used to play the role He does. |  |  |  |  |

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| **THEME 2 – THE DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE: WHAT IS PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE?** | | | | |
| **Key Concepts:**  Acquaintance knowledge – ‘knowing of’  Ability knowledge – ‘knowing how’  Propositional knowledge – ‘knowing that’  Tripartite definition of knowledge |  |  |  |  |
| **2.1 Distinction between: acquaintance knowledge, ability knowledge and propositional knowledge (knowing ‘of’, knowing ‘how’ and knowing ‘that’).** |  |  |  |  |
| **2.2 The tripartite view: justified true belief is necessary and sufficient for propositional knowledge (S knows that p only if S is justified in believing that p, p is true and S believes that p) (necessary and sufficient conditions).** |  |  |  |  |
| **Knowledge/Specification** | **Not Yet** | **Not Sure** | **Yes** | **To address this before the exam I will:-** |
| Issues with the tripartite view:   1. The conditions are not individually necessary: 2. Justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge 3. Truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge 4. Belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge. 5. Cases of lucky true beliefs show that the justification condition should be either strengthened, added to or replaced (ie Gettier-style problems).  * Responses to issues with the tripartite view, including: * Strengthen the justification condition: Infallibilism and the requirement for an impossibility of doubt (Descartes) * Add a 'no false lemmas' condition (J+T+B+N) * Replace 'justified' with 'reliably formed' (R+T+B) (reliabilism) * Replace 'justified' with an account of epistemic virtue (V+T+B). | - |  |  |  |

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| **Knowledge/Specification** | **Not Yet** | **Not Sure** | **Yes** | **To address this before the exam I will:-** |
| **THEME 3 – THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS AND THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE: WHERE DO IDEAS/CONCEPTS AND KNOWLEDGE COME FROM?** | | | | |
| **Key Concepts:**  Concept empiricism  Knowledge empiricism  Rationalism  Innatism |  |  |  |  |
| **3.1 Concept empiricism: all concepts are derived from experience (tabula rasa, impressions and ideas, simple and complex concepts).** |  |  |  |  |
| Issues with concept empiricism, including:   * Concept innatism (rationalism): there are at least some innate concepts (Descartes’ ‘trademark’ argument, and other proposed examples such as universals, causation, infinity, numbers, etc.) * Concept empiricist arguments against concept innatism: * Alternative explanations (no such concept or concept re-defined as based on experiences) * Locke’s arguments against innatism; * Its reliance on the non-natural. |  |  |  |  |
| **Knowledge/Specification** | **Not Yet** | **Not Sure** | **Yes** | **To address this before the exam I will:-** |
| **3.2 Knowledge empiricism: all synthetic knowledge is a posteriori (Hume’s ‘fork’); all a priori knowledge is (merely) analytic.** |  |  |  |  |
| Issues with knowledge empiricism, including:   1. Knowledge innatism (rationalism): there is at least some innate a priori knowledge (arguments from Plato and Leibniz)  * Knowledge empiricist arguments against knowledge innatism:  1. alternative explanations (no such knowledge, in fact based on experiences or merely analytic); 2. Locke’s arguments against innatism; 3. its reliance on the non-natural 4. Intuition and deduction thesis (rationalism): we can gain synthetic a priori knowledge through intuition and deduction (Descartes on the existence of self, God and the external world)  * Knowledge empiricist arguments against intuition and deduction:  1. the failure of the deductions or the analytically true (tautological) nature of the conclusions 2. Arguments against knowledge empiricism: the limits of empirical knowledge (Descartes’ sceptical arguments). | - |  |  |  |

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| **REVISION**  **Use the information on this checklist to make revision cards and notes** |

**Grade tracking:**

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*Note: You should discuss this checklist regularly with your subject teacher/mentor*